[PLUTO-security]
[Fwd: Postfix 1.1.12 remote DoS / Postfix 1.1.11 bounce scanning]
Tom aka 'Dido'
tom at pluto.linux.it
Tue Aug 5 17:22:26 CEST 2003
Ho trovato il messaggio originale....
Dido
-----Forwarded Message-----
> From: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf a ghettot.org>
> To: bugtraq a securityfocus.com
> Subject: Postfix 1.1.12 remote DoS / Postfix 1.1.11 bounce scanning
> Date: 03 Aug 2003 21:12:34 +0200
>
>
> Good morning list, ,--. ,--.
> \ /-~-\ /
> ======================================================= )' a a `( ========
> 1. Posfix 1.1.12 remote DoS (CAN-2003-0540) .( ,---. ),
> ========================================================`(_o_o_)'=========
>
> There is a remotely exploitable denial of service vulnerability in Postfix
> up to and including 1.1.12. The vulnerability does not affect the most
> current version, 2.0, due to a major overhaul of the address parsing code.
> Releases prior to 1.1.9 are not vulnerable by default, but will be exposed
> if append_dot_mydomain is turned off in the configuration file (see
> section 3 for more details).
>
> Recent 1.1 releases, having no publicly disclosed security problems, are
> still commonly used and shipped in several popular Linux distributions,
> including Red Hat 9 or Debian 3.0 (woody) - those distributions both ship
> 1.1.11.
>
> The vulnerability lies in the address parser code. By supplying a remote
> SMTP listener with a malformed envelope address, it is possible to,
> depending on the method, either:
>
> - Cause the queue manager, nqmgr, to lock up permanently, effectively
> stopping any queue processing - all mail traffic supressed. Restarting
> the service has no effect - a specific entry has to be removed from
> the queue to fix the problem. For that reason, a builtin watchdog
> that restarts nqmgr after a period of nonresponsive behavior, is
> not able to cause a recovery from this condition.
>
> The attack can be performed by forcing the service to queue a mail
> to an address that would generate a bounce - depending on the
> configuration, it can be <nonexistent a local-server-name>, or, if user
> names are being checked, <nonexistent@[127.0.0.1]>. The "mail from" or
> "Errors-To" address should be set to "<.!>" or
> "<.!@local-server-name>". An attempt to parse and rewrite the latter
> address when preparing a bounce will lock up the service.
>
> ...or...
>
> - Lock up a single instance of the smtp listener in a unusable state
> that persists after the client disconnects. By repeating this,
> it is possible to DoS the service (or entire system, depending
> on the configuration) in a very effective manner.
>
> This can be achieved by providing any valid "MAIL FROM" in a SMTP
> conversation, and then supplying a "RCPT TO" similar to "MAIL FROM"
> in the previous example. If the server is vulnerable, the session
> should freeze at this point.
>
> The latter approach, since it only creates a single stalled process, is a
> less intrusive method of testing your systems for this issue remotely.
>
> The attack can be detected by looking for "resolve_clnt_query: null
> recipient" in your maillog. It is then necessary to find the problematic
> entry in the queue and remove it manually, then restart the service.
>
> It should be noted that it is often possible to attack instances that do
> not have port 25 reachable from the Internet - envelope addresses and
> certain headers such as Errors-To may very well be preserved when a
> message is relayed via another system or service.
>
>
> ==========================================================================
> 2. Postfix 1.1.11 Bounce scan / DDoS agent issue (CAN-2003-0468)
> ==========================================================================
>
> There is a remotely exploitable vulnerability in Postfix 1.1.11 (and
> earlier versions). Postfix 1.1.12 and 2.0 is NOT affected. The problem was
> apparently spotted and fixed in 1.1.12 (note 200221121 in HISTORY file),
> although it has been tagged as a change preventing bogus log entries, and
> not described as a security issue; there was no public information or
> discussion about its implications on security forums, not prompting users
> to upgrade. It might be that the significance of this problem was simply
> overlooked.
>
> Since the issue has been rediscovered during the analysis of the previous
> issue, I decided it's worth mentioning here, especially since 1.1.11 is
> shipped all over the place.
>
> The problem enables an attacker to use Postfix 1.1.11 as a DDoS agent or
> for bounce scans of other hosts on the Internet, or probing firewalled
> internal networks. The problem is triggered by an attempt to deliver to:
>
> <[server_ip]:service!@local-host-name>
>
> This address will cause Postfix to connect an arbitrary IP at an arbitrary
> port and attempt to talk SMTP. The conversation will likely fail before
> any user-dependent data is sent to the remote party, which limits the
> exposure, but is sufficient to bounce-scan.
>
> The address can be either sent in "RCPT TO" (the attacker would have the
> right to relay to this system - which makes it a viable method of
> bounce-scanning your ISP/mail account provider), in which case the sender
> would then look for bounces stating the problem (SMTP conversation error,
> connection timeout or connection refused), or in "MAIL FROM" / Errors-To,
> in which case, the attacker can likely perform a queue timing attack to
> detect whether a port is open by inserting control messages that are
> intended to bounce.
>
> When a port is open, SMTP greeting timeout occurs after a longer while,
> pausing queue processing. When a port is closed, the entry is immediately
> marked as deferred and queue processing continues.
>
> It is also possible to use this problem to stage a DDoS attack, by making
> a number of Postfix hosts around the world attempt to connect services on
> a particular machine over and over again, until each queue entry finally
> expires and is discarded or delivered to postmaster.
>
>
> ==========================================================================
> 3. Vendor status / fix and workardound information
> ==========================================================================
>
> Wietse Venema has been contacted on July 27 regarding the first issue,
> confirmed the problem described in #1 and released a patch to address it.
> The information was then passed down to vendor-sec.
>
> Below is a detailed fix and workaround info from the author:
>
> To find out your Postfix version, use the command "postconf
> mail_version". Versions prior to 1.1 show a date instead of a
> version number (e.g., Postfix-20010228-pl08). Versions 1.1 and
> later may show a date in addition to the version number (e.g.,
> 2.0.14-20030717).
>
> Postfix versions 2.0 and later:
>
> Not vulnerable, because the trivial-rewrite code was completely
> restructured. The current Postfix version is 2.0.13.
>
> A not vulnerable Postfix version can protect vulnerable Postfix
> systems as described in the workarounds section below.
>
> Postfix versions 1.1.9 .. 1.1.12:
>
> These are vulnerable, and are fixed by upgrading to version
> 1.1.13 which will be made available via http://www.postfix.org/
> and via individual vendors, or by applying the patch below.
> The workarounds section below has instructions for sites that
> cannot upgrade Postfix immediately.
>
> Postfix versions prior to 1.1.9:
>
> These become vulnerable only when the append_dot_mydomain
> feature is set to "no" (you can verify this with the command
> "postconf append_dot_mydomain"). Use the command "postconf -e
> append_dot_mydomain=yes" to update the setting if necessary.
>
> Sites that must use "append_dot_mydomain=no" should either
> upgrade to a fixed Postfix version, or should apply the one-line
> patch at the end of this text. This patch has been tested with
> Postfix versions back to 19991231.
>
> Workarounds for Postfix versions 1.1.9 - 1.1.12:
>
> Verify that the append_dot_mydomain feature is set to "yes" by
> using the command "postconf append_dot_mydomain". Use the
> command "postconf -e append_dot_mydomain=yes" to update the
> setting if necessary.
>
> Sites that must use "append_dot_mydomain=no" should either
> upgrade to a fixed Postfix version, or should apply the one-line
> patch at the end of this text.
>
> Specify "resolve_dequoted_address=no" in main.cf.
>
> An additional workaround is needed for hosts that must forward
> mail from the Internet to, for example, primary MX hosts or to
> internal hosts. This is because with resolve_dequoted_address=no,
> Postfix no longer recognizes user a bad.domain@good.domain as a
> mail relaying attempt. To close this loophole, use a regular
> expression to block sender-specified routing in SMTP recipient
> addresses:
>
> /etc/postfix/main.cf:
> smtpd_recipient_restrictions =
> permit_mynetworks,
> check_recipient_access regexp:/etc/postfix/recipient_regexp
> ...other restrictions...
> check_relay_domains
>
> /etc/postfix/recipient_regexp:
> /[%!@].*[%!@]/ 550 Sender-specified routing rejected
>
> Workarounds to protect vulnerable down-stream Postfix systems:
>
> Reject Errors-To: message headers with multiple routing
> operators:
>
> /etc/postfix/main.cf:
> header_checks = regexp:/etc/postfix/header_checks
>
> /etc/postfix/header_checks:
> /^errors-to:.*[%!@].*[%!@]/ reject
>
> Reject SMTP sender addresses with multiple routing operators:
>
> /etc/postfix/main.cf:
> smtpd_sender_restrictions =
> check_sender_access regexp:/etc/postfix/sender_regexp
> ...other restrictions...
>
> /etc/postfix/sender_regexp:
> /[%!@].*[%!@]/ 550 Sender-specified routing rejected
>
> diff -cr /tmp/postfix-1.1.12/src/trivial-rewrite/resolve.c src/trivial-rewrite/resolve.c
> *** /tmp/postfix-1.1.12/src/trivial-rewrite/resolve.c Fri Nov 22 12:32:33 2002
> --- src/trivial-rewrite/resolve.c Mon Jul 28 11:36:49 2003
> ***************
> *** 148,153 ****
> --- 148,154 ----
> if (saved_domain)
> tok822_free_tree(saved_domain);
> saved_domain = domain;
> + domain = 0;
> }
>
> /*
>
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